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Summary 
1. Offsetting is emerging as an important but controversial approach for managing 
environment-development conflicts. Biodiversity offsets are designed to 
compensate for damage to biodiversity from development by providing 
biodiversity gains elsewhere. 
2. Here we suggest how biodiversity offset policies can generate behaviours that 
exacerbate biodiversity decline, and identify four perverse incentives that could 
arise even from soundly-designed policies.  
3. These include incentives for (i) entrenching or exacerbating baseline biodiversity 
declines, (ii) winding back non-offset conservation actions, (iii) crowding out of 
conservation volunteerism, and (iv) false public confidence in environmental 
outcomes due to marketing offset actions as gains.  
4. Synthesis and applications. Despite its goal of improving biodiversity outcomes, 
there is potential for best-practice offsetting to achieve the opposite result. 
Reducing this risk requires coupling offset crediting baselines to measured 
trajectories of biodiversity change and understanding the potential interaction 
between offsetting and other environmental policies.  
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Introduction  
Environmental offsetting—compensation for environmental impacts with equivalent 
benefits generated elsewhere—is emerging as an important approach for balancing the 
competing demands of development and conservation (Madsen et al. 2011). Although 
policy requiring forms of environmental offsetting has existed since the 1970s, carbon 
offsetting has only become common since the turn of the century, and biodiversity 
offsetting is experiencing a rapid expansion (McKenney & Kiesecker 2009; Spash 2010; 
Madsen et al. 2011). Compared to approaches where ‘gains’, such as additions to reserve 
networks, are celebrated in isolation from the losses (McDonald-Madden et al. 2009), 
offsetting represents a step towards a more holistic view of responsibility for the 
environment, integrating both environmental losses and gains.  
 
Yet controversy around environmental offsetting is growing. This has been in relation to 
issues specific to offsetting such as the fungibility of losses and gains (Bull et al. 2013), 
as well as design, implementation, and compliance issues (e.g. Walker et al. 2009) which 
are challenges to many conservation approaches. However, broader critiques of offsetting 
are also emerging; for example, claims that market-based approaches create a distraction 
from urgently-needed changes in human behaviour and institutions (Spash 2010) or 
corrupt the social good of the environment (Nyberg & Wright 2013). In addition, poorly-
conceived policy introductions, especially those designed in isolation from the system in 
which they are embedded, have the potential to introduce perverse incentives that can 
undermine their effectiveness (de Gorter, Drabik & Just 2013). Here, we examine 
whether the introduction of biodiversity offset policies produce perverse incentives that 
could result in worse environmental outcomes? 
 
Biodiversity offset policies 
Biodiversity offsets aim to address environmental damage associated with development 
by achieving additional biodiversity gains elsewhere (Fig. 1a; Kiesecker et al. 2009). 
They are generally implemented as part of a ‘mitigation hierarchy’ requiring losses are 
avoided, then minimized, with unavoidable losses being fully compensated for by offsets 
that achieve ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity (BBOP 2012). Biodiversity gains can usually be 
generated in two ways: active habitat creation or restoration to improve existing 
biodiversity values in a given location (Maron et al. 2012), or so-called ‘averted loss’ 
offsets such as protecting vegetation at risk of being cleared (Gordon et al. 2011).  
 
The scientific literature on biodiversity offsetting generally concludes the approach is 
sound in principle (e.g. Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Maron et al., 2012; Bull et al., 
2013), but has yet to reliably demonstrate no net loss of biodiversity in practice, due to 
the few empirical assessments of its effectiveness available (Curran, Hellweg & Beck 
2013). There is also general agreement about many conceptual and practical challenges to 
their successful implementation (Moilanen et al. 2008; Maron et al. 2012) but there has 
been no discussion of perverse incentives that may arise.   
 
 
Perverse incentives and offset policies 
With the creation of an incentive structure, there is a risk of unintentionally introducing 
perverse incentives, whereby a policy intended to solve a problem inadvertently results in 
an incentive for behavior that actually worsens the problem. A well-known example 
resulted from the US Endangered Species Act, which aimed to protect the habitat of 
endangered species through restricting land use. This introduced a perverse incentive for 
landowners to deliberately clear habitat for endangered species preemptively in order to 
avoid landuse constraints on their property (Lueck & Michael 2003). 
 
Here, we argue that biodiversity offsets risk the creation of multiple perverse incentives, 
which may reduce their effectiveness or at worst, increase rates of biodiversity loss rather 
than reducing them. Below we illustrate perverse incentives that could arise and discuss 
approaches for mitigating them. 
 
 
Perverse incentives relevant for biodiversity offset polices 
Biodiversity offsetting potentially introduces incentive structures that need to be carefully 
managed, even when offsetting follows best-practice guidelines (BBOP 2012) and fully 
implements the mitigation hierarchy. Below we describe what we believe to be the four 
most important perverse incentives, though others are also likely to be produced. 
 
1. Entrenching or exacerbating baseline declines  
Implicitly or explicitly, most offset policies are intended to achieve no net loss of 
biodiversity relative to a “business as usual” baseline trajectory (e.g. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2012; DEFRA 2013a; Quétier, Regnery & Levrel 2013; 
Fig. 1). In other words, the amount of ‘credit’ a given offset action yields is the 
difference in the biodiversity outcomes expected from the offset action (thick dashed 
line in Fig. 1), and those expected without the offset action—the “crediting baseline” 
in Fig. 1 (sensu Angelsen 2008). By this definition, no net loss occurs at the point 
when the combination of loss from the development and the gain from the offset 
reaches the crediting baseline, depicted as t2 in Fig. 1. Selection of a plausible 
baseline against which to calculate credits is thus central to offset effectiveness, 
because to meet the “no net loss” requirement, offset credits are only required to be 
sufficient to maintain the trajectory of the selected baseline across the impact and 
offset sites collectively (Fig. 1). 
 
Because of this, the crediting baseline becomes “locked in” by the offset policy: it 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy across impact and offset sites. Further, the more 
widespread offsetting becomes, the more the selected crediting baseline influences 
overall biodiversity trajectories. If an unrealistically steep baseline of decline is used 
due to uncertainty or an incentive to exaggerate it (see Incentive 2), this steeper rate 
of decline is then made real by the policy (Fig. 2). Worse still, most evaluations of 
offset policy outcomes have found that no net loss compared to the selected baseline 
has not been achieved (Maron et al. 2012; Bull et al. 2013; Curran, Hellweg & Beck 
2013), resulting in net loss of biodiversity compared even to a declining baseline.  
 
 
Whilst the challenges of specifying accurate baselines are common to most 
conservation interventions (Maron et al. 2013), they are of particular importance in 
offsetting as an incorrect baseline can result in biodiversity loss. For other types of 
conservation interventions this is more likely reduce potential gains. 
 
2. Incentive to wind back other conservation actions  
Not only may declines be unintentionally entrenched due to the choice of baseline, 
but where the policymaker has an interest (direct or indirect) in facilitating 
development, there is an incentive to maintain steep baselines of decline, or even to 
worsen them (Pattanayak, Wunder & Ferraro 2010). This arises because a steeper 
baseline generates more credits from the ‘averted losses’ resulting from the offset, 
and averted loss offsetting is often less-expensive and easier than generating new 
biodiversity (Maron et al. 2012). This steeper baseline is then locked in by the policy 
(Fig. 2a & b; Incentive 1).  
 
Government-mandated offset schemes often state an intention to use offsets to 
‘reduce green tape’ and ensure offset credits can be obtained at reasonable cost 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012; DEFRA 2013a). Yet any conservation action 
done outside the offset policy effectively competes within the offset market, reducing 
opportunities for buyers of credits. For example, the designation of land for 
conservation extinguishes the potential for these areas to be used as offsets. At worst, 
the desire to ensure a liquid offset market with affordable credits may incentivize the 
winding-back of environmental regulations (Lloyd 2010). Similarly, conservation 
initiatives that improve the trajectory for threatened species reduce the opportunity 
for generating offset credits—averted loss cannot be a means of credit generation for 
something not expected to decline. A ‘well-functioning’ offset scheme—from the 
perspective of having a relatively large and liquid biodiversity market—therefore 
risks being in direct conflict with conservation investment.  
 
3. Crowding out of volunteerism  
Unpaid, voluntary conservation work is a significant contributor to conservation 
outcomes globally (Conrad & Hilchey 2011). In some countries, such as Australia, 
offsets are increasingly being used as ‘community engagement’ opportunities, 
whereby volunteers or even schoolchildren are invited to assist in an offset action. For 
example, restoration works required as part of an offset for clearing of Banksia 
woodland near Perth were performed by community volunteers (DEC 2012), and past 
volunteer restoration work in a public park was retrospectively claimed as an offset 
for urban development in Canberra (Gibbons & Zeil 2014). Whether participants in 
such cases are aware their labor is providing a service that developers otherwise 
would be required to pay for is arguable. 
 
If such volunteer participation in offsets redirects activities from other voluntary 
conservation works, shifting volunteer efforts to actions that would have been 
required regardless of their participation, then additionality of conservation outcomes 
from the offset is eroded, resulting in a net loss of biodiversity. This same risk 
plagues carbon offsets (Spash 2010). Further, if individuals begin to view 
conservation activities as only occurring so that losses can occur elsewhere, they may 
withdraw from such activities more generally, further exacerbating this perverse 
incentive. 
 
4. False confidence in environmental outcomes due to marketing offset actions as 
gains  
There is a tendency for stakeholders involved in offset trading to focus on the 
environmental “gain” side of the trade, and to sell offset trades as beneficial 
conservation outcomes in their own right. For instance, the proposed UK (no net loss) 
biodiversity offset policy has been lauded as “an exciting opportunity to look at how 
we can improve the environment as well as grow the economy” (DEFRA 2013b). Yet 
no net loss offset policies are by definition neutral, not positive, in their 
environmental outcomes, and if the baseline is one of decline, then that decline 
continues. Developers overselling their offset gains may reinforce this false 
confidence in offsets (Jones et al. 2014). 
 
Presenting offsets as environmental ‘wins’ can generate false confidence amongst the 
public regarding environmental outcomes: the impression could be gained that 
biodiversity in general is improving, even as decline continues. This can lead to 
complacency and reduced pressure on governments to invest in conservation actions, 
resulting perversely in poorer environmental outcomes, given the significance of 
public pressure in achieving environmental gains (Layzer 2011). Further, such false 
confidence in offsets can mean approval of damage that would otherwise not be 
approved. 
 
 
Reducing the risk of perverse incentives  
Managing the risk of perverse outcomes driven by the introduction of biodiversity offset 
policies will require a range of approaches, some of which may be challenging to 
implement. Nonetheless, as the use of biodiversity offsetting continues to increase 
globally, it is important such risks are acknowledged and addressed explicitly. Below we 
discuss measures that may reduce or mitigate the negative outcomes from the perverse 
incentives we have identified. 
 
Transparent baselines that are updated over time 
Transparency regarding crediting baselines in biodiversity offsetting is generally poor 
(Maron, Rhodes & Gibbons 2013), despite recognition of the importance of the issue in 
the carbon offsetting literature. For example Griscom et al. (2009) found that depending 
on assumptions about the baseline, carbon credits calculated from avoided emissions 
ranged over two orders of magnitude for the same quantity of actual emissions reductions. 
Thus, if a dynamic crediting baseline is used in an offset policy (e.g. Fig. 1b), then this 
baseline needs to be clearly articulated. This includes providing the reasoning, 
assumptions and evidence underlying the baseline estimation.  
 
Regular reviews—for example, every 10 years—of crediting baselines can help 
determine if they should be revised based on the background trajectory of biodiversity 
(Griscom et al. 2009). Ideally, if background trajectories of biodiversity eventually 
improve and trend upwards, this should result in the obsolescence of declining crediting 
baselines, and therefore of averted loss offsetting. Though it is important to note that the 
baseline does not need be declining, and in some cases flat or even increasing baselines 
may be appropriate (Bull et al. 2014). Indeed, limiting credits to gains achieved relative 
to a flat baseline even where background declines of biodiversity are ongoing may be a 
desirable short-cut to stemming declines. However, this implies proponents would be 
required to offset not only the impact for which they are responsible, but also a 
component of ‘background’ decline. 
 
Linking crediting baselines to biodiversity trajectories  
If offset gains are measured against a dynamic baseline, and averted loss offsetting is 
permitted, then offset schemes become inseparably linked to the broader range of 
activities occurring in the landscape, and their positive and negative consequences for 
biodiversity. This is because biodiversity trajectories beyond the offset scheme determine 
the crediting baseline used in the scheme (Pattanayak, Wunder & Ferraro 2010). This 
subtle point has important consequences. For example, conservation interventions outside 
the scheme may change the background biodiversity trajectory, and should therefore 
impact the crediting baseline, changing the requirements for an offset to achieve “no net 
loss”. However, if the offsets scheme is systematically failing to deliver no net loss, then 
the offset scheme itself will result in steepening the baseline of decline. Updating the 
crediting baseline to reflect this would then allow more credit to be generated from 
avoided loss offsets (Fig. 2) potentially resulting in a feedback loop of increasing 
biodiversity decline.  
 
One way of mitigating the risk of positive feedbacks exacerbating declines is by 
explicitly coupling crediting baselines and biodiversity trajectories, such as through 
parallel reporting of the assumptions behind offset requirements and the wider 
biodiversity trends from which those assumptions are drawn. This could help mitigate 
perverse incentives 1 and 2 by clarifying the link between the baseline in the offset 
scheme and the conservation outcomes being achieved in the absence of the offset. Any 
incentive to overestimate averted loss credits from an offset action could then be 
tempered by its corollary—that background trends under current government policies are 
undesirable. Another approach for dealing with this issue is to implement strategic 
approaches that integrate offset schemes with other relevant policies at larger spatial and 
managerial scales, a point has been made in the recent literature (Hayes 2014). 
 
Transparent accounting 
A crucial element to mitigating some of these perverse incentives is clear and publicly 
visible accounting. This should record the environmental losses (impacts) and associated 
gains (offsets) as well as the legal agreements and financial flows associated with the 
offset. Two examples that go some way towards achieving these goals are the US 
Regulatory In lieu fee and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS; 
http://geo.usace.army.mil/ribits) and the Western Australian Government’s 
Environmental Offsets Register (http://www.offsetsregister.wa.gov.au/public/home), set 
up to create a searchable public record of offset agreements. Having this information 
publically available should also help with understanding the extent to which offset 
funding is (or isn’t) additional. 
 
Better education about offsets 
Outreach and education can help counter the public’s poor understanding of the 
objectives of environmental offsetting. A balanced exposition of offsetting would explain 
its utility as a market-based instrument as well as its limitations (Bull 2013). This 
includes the fact that offset activities are not “conservation gains” but are making up for 
losses elsewhere and are neutral at best. It should also include issues around baselines 
and counterfactuals, which are often misunderstood (Ferraro 2009). The most intuitive, 
and anecdotally most common, interpretation of “no net loss” in the context of offset 
policies is no net loss of biodiversity relative to what was present at the time of 
development.  Correcting this perception may substantially change public understanding 
of what offsets can achieve.   
 
To reduce crowding out of volunteer conservation effects, governments should be careful 
not to succumb to the temptation to oversell offsets, or claim them as conservation gains. 
Genuine gains from offsets are possible, but are only likely where a “net gain” in 
biodiversity has been explicitly intended, and even in this case, only a subset of any 
offset can be celebrated as a gain. Despite this, no net loss offsetting continues to be 
promoted as achieving conservation benefits. For example, the UK Environment Bank 
states that “the industry [offsetting] creates is one of wildlife restoration projects across 
the country, which is badly needed” (Environment Bank 2013). Although restoration 
projects are certainly needed to compensate for past damage, the new industry planned 
for generating future restoration offsets will not meet this need, as the no net loss 
objective of the UK offset policy means at best they will only compensate for future 
losses. 
 
Conclusion 
The issue of perverse incentives resulting from biodiversity offsetting has not been yet 
been explored in the academic literature, nor is it well-recognized amongst policymakers. 
We believe, as argued here, that as offset policies continue to proliferate and mature, an 
awareness of these issues is crucial to avoiding grave environmental risks. Development 
impacts on biodiversity are unlikely to cease or even abate in the near future. In this 
context, offsetting remains one of few options for delivering truly ‘sustainable’ 
development, and both internal and external policy critiques will assist in improving such 
schemes.  
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1 The self-fulfilling nature of crediting baselines for “no net loss” biodiversity 
offsets. The development impact occurs at t1 with a loss of biodiversity b1. Biodiversity 
gains are measured from the “crediting baseline” which should characterize the change in 
biodiversity that would have occurred without the offset. We assume offsets are 
implemented at the time of development and the gains from the offset actions accrue 
gradually over time (as is allowed in many policies). In (a) the baseline is assumed to be 
static and fixed at the biodiversity value at t1; (b) shows the more typical case wherein 
losses and gains are measured against a declining “business as usual” crediting baseline.  
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Fig. 2 The consequences of an overly steep crediting baseline compared to a realistic one. 
If the crediting baseline is implausibly steep, an offset that achieves no net loss relative to 
(a) does not achieve no net loss relative to a realistic baseline (b). In addition, the gain 
from the offset as measured from the realistic baseline (b) is smaller that what would be 
estimated from the steeper baseline.  
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